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I. INTRODUCTION
HE impact of the crisis in Indonesia’s national economy is often described as a
modern manufacturing, urban, and Javanese crisis. As the statistics show,
the manufacturing and other urban-centered sectors like construction and
financial business recorded double-digit negative growth in 1998. Poverty increased
more sharply from 1996 to 1998 in urban areas than in rural areas when measured
by the increased number and percentages of poor people, although the absolute
number of the poor was larger in the rural areas (BPS 1999a, pp. 44–46; 1999b,
p. 87). In the manufacturing sector, all the subsectors except oil refining recorded
negative growth in 1998 (see Thee’s paper in this volume, p. 430, Table V). Of
these subsectors, the hardest hit was the metal-working and machinery industry
(ISIC 38) which declined by 52 per cent and which was characterized by imported-
inputs dependence, domestic-market orientation, and Jabotabek1 concentration. In
contrast, the least-hit subsector with a 2 per cent decline was the food industry
(ISIC 31) which included the processing of domestically produced primary com-
modity like cacao, coffee, palm oil, and fishes. Such a processing industry was
mainly or partly export-oriented and mostly located on islands other than Java.
Thus a broad picture of the crisis shows that the impact was quite heterogeneous by
sector, industry, location, and market orientation.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
This paper is part of the outcome of research I conducted during a stay in Indonesia from 1996 to 1999
as an overseas senior research fellow of the Institute of Developing Economies. For help in conduct-
ing field studies, I would like to express special thanks to all the respondents who cooperated in the
interviews, as well as Ms. Krisni Murti M.S. and Mr. Yohanes Sancahyohadi of the Astra Dharma
Bhakti Foundation in Jakarta, Mr. Jon Haloho of UIUKK (Information Unit for Small Enterprises and
Cooperatives) in East Jakarta under the Astra Dharma Bhakti Foundation, Mr. Umardani N. H. of the
industrial cooperative in Ceper, Central Java, and Mr. Budi Santoso and Mr. Cuk Sutoyo of PT Agrindo
in Surabaya.
1 Jabotabek is an abbreviation for the extended metropolitan area covering Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang,
and Bekasi.
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But this picture does not show how the crisis affected small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). Was the impact on SMEs similar to or different from that on
large-scale enterprises? The general perception is that small-scale sectors were less
affected or even well-performing because most of the enterprises were engaged in
rural-based, agriculture-related, and less modern sectors and were debt-free, in con-
trast to most large-scale enterprises which were heavily burdened by debt and reli-
ant on modern urban markets where demand collapsed. This perception has pro-
vided a basis for advocates of SME-driven economic recovery.2 However, there are
some researchers who assert that SMEs were more seriously affected than large-
scale enterprises, at least in the manufacturing sector. This argument is supported
by statistics which show a larger decrease in the number of establishments and
workforce of small and cottage enterprises compared with those of large and me-
dium-sized enterprises between 1996 and 1998 (BPS 1999b, p. 42; see Thee’s pa-
per, p. 439, Table XI). Others have argued that the size of enterprises is not related
to the degree of crisis impact;  what has mattered has been the type of industry,
products produced, location, and market orientation. However, the varification of
this argument has been difficult because of limited detailed statistics and studies on
the production and performance of small enterprises in subsectors of the manufac-
turing sector, while large and medium-sized enterprises are covered by comprehen-
sive annual industrial statistics. This paper is an attempt to fill in some of that lack-
ing information on how Indonesia’s crisis affected SMEs.
The study presents two hypotheses. One is that the performance of SMEs showed
wide variation that could not be explained by a difference in the type of industry,
product, or location. SMEs in the same industry in the same location could show
quite different performance. Even in the worst-hit metal-working and machinery
industry, there could be surviving and even well-performing SMEs. If this hypoth-
esis is true, the question would be what factors caused the variance in performance.
The second hypothesis is that one of the determinants that caused such variance of
performance was the “linkages” that each SME had formed with buyers of its prod-
ucts.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the relevant
statistics and studies on the impact of Indonesia’s crisis on SMEs and then explains
the methodology of this study. The third section discusses the findings of this study,
and examines SME performance, the factors affecting their performance, and their
responses in order to survive the adverse conditions. The last section provides a
summarizing conclusion.
2 See Jellinek and Rustanto (1999) who describe the crisis as “an unprecedented economic boom in
the small-scale sector” and surmise “the rediscover of people’s economy.”
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II. REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
A. Review of Relevant Statistics and Studies
As of mid-2000, there are not many statistics or studies concerning SMEs since
the outbreak of Indonesia’s economic crisis. Tables I through III provide a sum-
mary of statistics compiled by the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium
Entrepreneurs (MCSME) in cooperation with the BPS-Statistics Indonesia (BPS)
showing changes in the number of enterprises, in workforce size, and in the value
added of small, medium, and large-scale enterprises by economic sectors for the
period of 1997 to 1999. The ministry determines size by annual turnover per enter-
prise, and this differs from the BPS definition which is determined by the size of the
TABLE  I
NUMBER OF SMALL ENTERPRISES BY SECTOR, 1997–98
Total No. of Share of Small
Enterprises Enterprises Growth Rate, 1997–98 (%)
(1,000 Unit)  (%)
1997 1998 1997 1998 Small Medium Large Total
1. Agriculture, livestock,
forestry, and fishery 22,613 23,099 56.6 62.7 2.6 1.2 1.8 2.6
2. Mining and quarrying 205 138 0.5 0.4 −32.8 10.2 9.8 −32.7
3. Manufacturing 2,829 2,115 7.1 5.7 −25.3 −9.1 −9.1 −25.2
4. Electricity, gas, water
supply 14 8 0.0 0.0 −45.5 1.4 0.0 −44.1
5. Construction 207 130 0.5 0.3 −38.3 −9.1 −9.4 −37.2
6. Trade, hotel, and
restaurant 10,014 8,348 25.1 22.6 −16.6 −18.1 −17.9 −16.6
7. Transport and
communication 1,855 1,510 4.7 4.1 −18.6 −15.1 −15.4 −18.6
8. Financial, rental, and
business services 78 23 0.2 0.1 −74.0 −26.6 −26.5 −70.2
9. Services 2,053 1,444 5.2 3.9 −29.7 −3.1 −3.1 −29.7
Total 39,767 36,815 99.8 99.9 −7.4 −14.2 −12.7 −7.4
Small enterprises 39,705 36,762
(%) (99.8) (99.9)
Medium enterprises 60 52
(%) (0.2) (0.1)
Large enterprises 2.1 1.8
(%) (0.0) (0.0)
Source: MCSME (1999).
Note: Small enterprises are defined as those with annual turnover of less than Rp 1 billion.
Medium enterprises are those with annual turnover of over Rp 1 billion and less than Rp 50
billion. Large enterprises are those with annual turnover of over Rp 50 billion.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sector
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workforce per establishment (one enterprise can own multiple establishments).
According to the ministry’s statistics, small enterprises with annual turnover below
Rp 1 billion raised their share during the crisis period in terms of every indicator,
though the absolute number of enterprises decreased. The share of value added in
GDP (in market prices) for small enterprises increased from 38.0 per cent in 1997
to 41.9 per cent in 1999, switching positions with large enterprises (having annual
turnover of over Rp 50 billion) which decreased from 42.3 to 40.6 per cent during
the same period. In the manufacturing sector, the ratio of the number of enterprises
and workforce size, unlike the absorbent agricultural sector, continually declined in
all three size categories during the period. However, in manufacturing’s share of
value added, that of small enterprises continued to increase, though still low, from
3.9 to 4.9 per cent between 1997 and 1999, whereas that for medium and large-
scale enterprises decreased in 1998 then recovered in 1999. The same picture can
be seen in Table IV which shows the changing ratios among the enterprise size
categories in the manufacturing sector using two different sources of statistics. Both
statistics showed the growing share for small manufacturing enterprises. This finding
naturally arouses research interest in which manufacturing subsector small enter-
TABLE  III
SHARE OF SMALL, MEDIUM, AND LARGE ENTERPRISES IN GDP, 1997–99
(%)
Share of Small Share of Medium Share of Large
Sector Enterprises Enterprises Enterprises
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
1. Agriculture, livestock,
forestry, and fishery 12.5 15.5 15.4 2.7 3.3 3.3 0.8 0.8 0.8
2. Mining and quarrying 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 7.1 12.2 9.5
3. Manufacturing 3.9 4.5 4.9 5.5 4.0 4.3 17.5 16.4 17.8
4. Electricity, gas,
water supply 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
5. Construction 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.4 1.3 3.7 2.1 2.0
6. Trade, hotel, and
restaurant 11.9 11.8 12.6 3.3 3.0 3.2 0.7 0.5 0.5
7. Transport and
communication 2.3 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.4 2.3 1.7 1.8
8. Financial, rental, and
business services 1.4 1.3 1.2 3.5 3.3 3.1 3.8 2.6 2.5
9. Services 3.1 2.9 3.1 0.6 0.5 0.5 5.2 4.4 4.8
Total 38.0 40.1 41.9 19.8 17.3 17.5 42.3 41.8 40.6
GDPa (Rp trillion) 238 386 450 124 163 188 265 394 437
Source: Same as for Table I.
Note: Values in 1999 are based on BPS projections.
a GDP at market prices.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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TABLE  IV
SHARE OF SMALL, MEDIUM, AND LARGE ENTERPRISES IN MANUFACTURING VALUE ADDED, 1996–98
(%)
Size Category
(A) (B)
1997 1998 1996 1998
Small enterprises 14.5 18.0 22.4 31.6
Medium enterprises 20.3 15.9
Large enterprises 65.1 66.1 77.6 68.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Manufacturing value
added (Rp billion) 168,178 234,503 120,233 140,821
Sources: (A): same as for Table I. (B): calculated from BPS (1999b, Tables 4.3 and 4.10).
Note: Definition of size category for (A) is as in Table I. Definition of (B) is as follows; Small
enterprises = 1–19 workers per establishment; Large and medium-sized enterprises = 20 and
more workers per establishment.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

prises showed the growing shares. But there are no detailed statistics available at
this moment to enable a subsector-cum-size analysis.
Filling the statistical vacuum to some extent are surveys on small enterprises that
have been conducted with varying coverage of sectors and locations.3 A survey by
the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Entrepreneurs (1998), which
may have the largest sampling (175,903 small enterprises) covering various sectors
throughout the country, showed that 86 per cent of the samples had sustained a
negative impact (had closed/stopped operations/declined) in 1998, and the worst-
hit sectors were livestock raising, mining, and manufacturing. A survey by AKATIGA
and the Asia Foundation (1999) monitored the performance of 701 small enter-
prises (with assets of less than Rp 200 million) in eighteen subsectors in 1998. They
measured performance with the volume of production and profits and found that 33
per cent of the samples and six subsectors (including one manufacturing subsectors)
showed a continuous decline, 39 per cent and six subsectors (four manufacturing)
showed a decline with the potential for improvement, and 28 per cent and six
subsectors (two manufacturing) showed an improving performance.4 This survey
also showed that improving performance was observed more outside Java than in
Java, and in rural areas than in urban areas. Thus these surveys with relatively wide
3 For a useful review, see Tambunan (2000, pp. 143–53) and Thee’s paper in this volume, pp. 438–40.
4 Six subsectors continuing to decline are the sugar refining, sidewalk food stalls in Java, floating-net
fishing, becak (tricycle) transportation, urban/rural transportation, and the photo copy service in-
dustry;  six declining subsectors with the potential to improvement are coffee refining, rattan manu-
facturing, shoe manufacturing, embroidery manufacturing, sidewalk food stalls outside of Java,
and pushcart vendors; six improving subsectors are cacao plantations, paprika plantations, clove
plantations, sidewalk vendors of imported second-hand clothes, pottery manufacturing, and furni-
ture manufacturing.
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coverage showed that as of 1998 more than 70 per cent of small enterprises were
negatively affected by the crisis in the broad sense.
There were two crucial factors affecting small enterprises according to AKATIGA
and the Asian Foundation (1999, pp. 24–36). One was final market demand and the
other was the rise in prices of input materials. The survey found that, while all the
export-oriented small enterprises showed improving performance, that of domes-
tic-market-oriented small enterprises varied partly because some benefited from
increasing local demand for cheaper substitutes. Regarding input materials, espe-
cially imported inputs, small enterprises had an obvious disadvantage compared
with larger enterprises due to their limited capacity to withstand price increases and
their weaker position for accessing materials. An additional third affecting factor
was the scarcity and high cost of bank loans (Tambunan 2000, p. 150), and a fourth
factor was the withdrawal of purchasing credit by material suppliers (only cash
purchases were accepted) and delayed payments by product buyers (JICA 2000,
p. 7). But other studies pointed out that bank credit was not a basic problem for
small enterprises, mainly because of their limited exposure to the banking sector
(Musa 1998;  A-AF 1999, p. 63).
A study by Sandee, Andadari, and Sulandjari (2000) focused on small enter-
prises engaging in export-oriented furniture manufacturing in Jepara, Central Java.
The cluster of small enterprises recorded a pronounced expansion during the crisis
in which the number of enterprises, size of workforce, and value of furniture ex-
ports grew on an annual average of 13.2 per cent, 11.6 per cent, and 31.8 per cent
respectively between 1996 and 1998. Although this case seems an exception in the
overall gloomy picture as reviewed above, and the key to their success lies no doubt
in their export orientation rather than size of enterprise, it provides some insights
into the dynamism of small enterprises. This study describes why the cluster could
take effective advantage of the rupiah’s substantial depreciation, attributing it to the
export capacity that these small enterprises had established before the crisis, to the
effects of clustering, and to the buyer-driven subcontracting network where local
and foreign exporters dominated decision making on quality, design, and delivery.
During the crisis this network flourished as small enterprises that switched from
local markets to exports became involved as second-tier subcontractors in the ex-
port trade. The foreign buyers also tried to attract small subcontractors by offering
longer-term contracts and trade financing.
The AKATIGA and Asia Foundation survey (1999) looked at how small enter-
prises responded in order to survive. These included substitution of imported raw
materials with local alternatives having lower prices and quality (e.g., pottery and
sidewalk food vendors), and the establishment of their own production facilities
(e.g., fish pellets made by fishery enterprises). However, the survey concluded that
most responses were not effective for survival. Moreover, collective responses by
small enterprises in the same subsector rarely took place (in only two out of eigh-
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teen subsectors) because of their tendency to act individually rather than to partici-
pate in formal organizations (A-AF 1999, pp. 46–50).
The above review indicates that although manufacturing was a fairly hard-hit
sector compared with the agricultural sector, small enterprises in the manufacturing
sector were relatively better off than larger enterprises. Some multi-sectoral sur-
veys showed evidence that a great majority of small enterprises was adversely af-
fected by the crisis, although a single-subsector study on the export-oriented indus-
try in Jepara showed a flourishing economic situation. According to these surveys,
factors affecting the performance of small enterprises included market demand, the
rise in prices of input materials, and the availability of bank and trade credit. Most
of the studies reviewed above have been multi-sectoral analyses, and there have
been few studies focusing on the manufacturing sector, especially the domestic-
market-oriented subsector. Thus the existing studies have not revealed why the im-
pact of the crisis on individual enterprises has varied, even among enterprises in the
same manufacturing subsector.
B. Methodology of the Study
The aim of this study is to investigate how the crisis affected SMEs based on this
author’s field study. The main points examined are (1) the impact of the crisis on
enterprise performance, (2) factors affecting performance, and (3) enterprise re-
sponses to the crisis.
This study is rather unique since it focuses on the metal-working and machinery
component industry. This focus is firstly to test the first hypothesis on varied SME
performance in the same industry. While there seemed little variation in perfor-
mance among enterprises in the Jepara example which enjoyed an export boom, the
domestic-market-oriented industry showed a wider variation as indicated by the
AKATIGA and Asia Foundation study. The focus on the industry is also to check
the second hypothesis that linkages matter. The metal-working and machinery com-
ponent industry is characterized by the divisibility of the production process and
the decomposability into accountable component units, therefore being amenable
to transaction linkage formation. Thus this study also examines how the linkages of
each enterprise related to the way it was affected by and was able to survive the crisis.
The field studies were conducted by the author through direct visits to the pro-
duction sites of enterprises and interviews with the owners. It was carried out peri-
odically from the end of 1997 through early 1999 in four selected locations in Java:
(1) East Jakarta, (2) Sukabumi, West Java, (3) Surabaya to Malang, East Java, and
(4) Ceper, Central Java.5 Studies were made of fifty enterprises which included
5 The outer islands could not be covered in this study. Although 67 per cent of the value-added
production of the machinery component industry is concentrated in Jabotabek and 80 per cent in
Java (Sato 1998, p. 116), this study could not be free from a “Java-bias” because of its lack of outer
island samples.
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inactive ones but did not cover those that had totally closed down or had switched
over to other business. Thus there is the possibility of a sampling bias toward sur-
viving enterprises.
Most of the surveyed enterprises can be categorized as “small enterprises” under
the definition of having annual turnover of less than Rp 1 billion, or as “small and
medium-sized establishments” based on the number of workers (five to nineteen
persons and twenty to ninety-nine persons respectively), though some enterprises
that are smaller and larger than this range are also included. Therefore, this paper
adopts the term “small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)” regarding the cat-
egory of enterprises sampled, implying that cottage-scale enterprises with less than
four workers are not a main object of this study.
III. IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON SMEs
A. Performance of the Industry and the Surveyed SMEs
Table V illustrates how the crisis adversely affected the metal-working and ma-
chinery industry. The industry’s real value added started to drop in 1997 ahead of
other manufacturing subsectors, and continued to record negative growth in 1999.
Growth in 1998 dropped by 52 per cent, over 20 points more than the second worst-
hit subsectors, cement and basic metals. The industry was one of the subsectors that
experienced the greatest contraction in the number of establishments and size of
TABLE  V
GROWTH RATES FOR THE METAL-WORKING AND MACHINERY INDUSTRY, 1996–99
Growth Rates (%)
1996 1999
1996 1997 1998 1999
Metal-working and machinery
industry (ISIC 38):
Nominal value added (Rp billion) 15,899 15,403 30.5 38.6 −39.1 14.8
Real value added (Rp billion) 11,191 4,756 4.6 −1.1 −52.3 −9.9
Establishments (units) 2,596 2,298 8.7 −2.0 −9.6 n.a.
Workforce (1,000 persons) 523 419 4.6 −0.3 −19.2 n.a.
Total Manufacturing (ISIC 31–39):
Nominal value added (Rp billion) 136,426 285,513 24.4 23.3 45.9 16.3
Real value added (Rp billion) 102,260 96,928 11.6 5.3 −11.9 2.2
Establishments (units) 22,997 20,422 6.7 −2.7 −8.8 n.a.
Workforce (1,000 persons) 4,215 3,536 1.0 −1.1 −15.2 n.a.
Source: BPS, Pendapatan nasional Indonesia [National income of Indonesia] (Jakarta), 1999
and 2000 editions; BPS (1999b).
Note: The figures given for the number of estahblishments and workforce size are those for
large and medium-sized enterprises and do not include those for small and cottage enterprises.
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workforce. The hardest-hit products in the industry were air conditioners and re-
frigerators (−96 per cent in production indices in 1997–99), internal combustion
engines (−87 per cent), automobile assembly (−80 per cent), motorcycles assembly
(−64 per cent), and electric and telephone cables (−54 per cent) (BPS, various is-
sues);  all are products where large-scale assemblers dominate the value-added pro-
duction.
Compared to the gloomy picture of the industry in aggregate, the SMEs in this
study, which all belonged to this industry, showed a variety of performance. This is
summarized in Table VI where the impact of the crisis on the performance of the
surveyed SMEs is graded into six levels from “highly positive” to “extremely nega-
tive,” judging from the changes in profit and production volume between 1997 and
1998. While almost half (47 per cent) of the enterprises suffered “negative” impact
and 65 per cent of the total fell into the broad negative range (levels 4 to 6), it is also
a fact that 35 per cent fell into the broad positive range in that the SMEs had posi-
tive growth or at least kept their production level constant. A notable point is that
the sample distribution is bimodal, having two peaks: one at the “negative” and
“highly negative” samples and another at the “highly positive” and “positive”
samples.
The performance of the SMEs was measured using such indicators as the growth
rate of assets, production volume, turnover, profit,6 and the number of workers, and
the time frame was from 1997 to 1998 (Table VII). The indicators of the “negative”
category, i.e., the mode of the sample, show the most prevailing performance among
SMEs in this industry. The volume of production dropped sharply by 51 per cent in
TABLE  VI
VARIANT IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON THE SMES SURVEYED
1. Highly positive Profit increase 8 16
2. Positive Production volume increase, profit constant or
decrease 6 12
3. Constant Production volume constant 3 6
4. Negative Production volume decrease, profit decrease 23 47
5. Highly negative Profit decrease to zero 7 14
6. Extremely negative Production volume decrease to zero 2 4
Total 49a 100
Source: Author’s field study.
a Excluding one sample which closed for reasons unrelated to the crisis.
Level of Crisis
Impact
Key Measurements
(Changes in 1997–98)
Number
of SMEs
Surveyed
Percentage
of Total
(%)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6 Profit here is operating profit, namely, turnover minus production costs and other operating ex-
penses including debt repayment.
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1998 compared with a year earlier as orders received dropped due to the contrac-
tion of demand. Although the fall in turnover was slightly smaller owing to a rise in
the selling price of products, profits decreased as much as 60 per cent in nominal
value since the cost of raw materials and other inputs upsurged during this time. In
order to cut production costs, the SMEs reduced their number of paid workers by
23 per cent. Their profit ratio fell by 13 points to a level of 16 per cent, which still
allowed them to keep their pre-crisis asset level without any disposal sales of pro-
duction facilities. In the “highly negative” category, every indicator showed a sharper
drop, and the profit level of the enterprises reached the break-even point. This cat-
egory included one sample which sold some machine tools to raise working capital.
The SMEs in this “highly negative” category were those which had lower profit
ratios than the other SMEs even before the crisis, as the profit figures indicate.
Enterprises in the “extremely negative” category had no orders and no production
activities at the time they were studied although they were still operating.7
In marked contrast, the SMEs in the “highly positive” category enjoyed turnover
almost four times higher in nominal value than the year before. This category in-
cluded two sampled enterprises in which turnover jumped by over nine times. The
average growth of profits for this category was 66 per cent, and profit growth was
TABLE  VII
PERFORMANCE OF SMES: GROWTH RATES OF INDICATORS, 1997–98
(%)
1. Highly positive 0.4 8 289 66 5 27 3
2. Positive 0 33 62 −39 −26 20 31
3. Constant 0 0 3 −21 −5 26 −15
4. Negative 0 −51 −43 −60 −13 16 −23
5. Highly negative −4.8 −70 −68 −100 −17 0 −31
6. Extremely negative 0 −100 −100 −100 −30 0a −25
Total −0.4 −21 43 −33 −12 18 −9
Source: Author’s field study.
Note: Assets, turnover, and profit are calculated at nominal value. Profit is operating profit,
meaning turnover minus production costs and other operating expenses including debt repay-
ment. Profit ratio = operating profit / turnover.
a Regarding profit in the “extremely negative” level, see footnote 7.
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Profit
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in 1998
Change of
Profit
Ratio
Level of Crisis
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7 There is a possibility that the enterprises in the “extremely negative” category were suffering losses,
but it was difficult to gauge the magnitude of their losses accurately by means of interviews. There-
fore the profits/losses of the enterprises in this category were considered to be “at least” zero. This
consideration, however, does not influence the results of the analysis in this study.
583SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES
still positive in real term deflated by the wholesale price index in manufacturing (65
per cent in 1997–98). Given the low growth in production volume (8 per cent) and
in the number of workers (3 per cent), a shift to higher value-added production was
one key for the success of this category.
The “positive” category, though seemingly in a similar boom like the “highly
positive” category, was actually a different story. The production volume of SMEs
in this category increased by 33 per cent and turnover by 62 per cent as price per
unit rose. However, these SMEs suffered a sharp drop in profits of almost 40 per
cent and a relatively large fall in profit ratio of 26 points on average. This was
because each component of production costs was pushed up by a rise in unit cost
multiplied by an increase in volume: costs of raw materials, either imported steel or
domestically procured steel or aluminum scrap;  energy costs such as electricity for
machinery processing and coke (all imported) for casting; wage payments as the
number of workers increased (by 31 per cent on average); and costs of borrowed
working capital as interest rates rose. This category suffered the irony that an ex-
pansion in production under the crisis produced negative results in profitability.
The SMEs in this category were the group with the highest profit ratios before the
crisis occurred.
Compared to the “positive” category, the “constant” category seemed more se-
cure in their survival, although only 6 per cent of the samples belonged to this
category. Given no significant fluctuation in production volume, the SMEs in this
category succeeded in keeping a relatively high 26 per cent ratio of ex-post profit,
despite the same upsurge in input costs and fall in profits as the other categories
experienced.
Then the next question is why the performance of SMEs in the same industry
varied so much and what factors caused the variation. How the “highly positive”
category could enjoy such a jump in turnover and how the SMEs in the “positive”
category obtained their increased volume of orders will also be investigated.
B. Factors Affecting the Performance of SMEs
There could be many factors affecting the performance of SMEs during the crisis
and they could vary depending on individual enterprises. Five possible factors are
taken up in this study: (1) market orientation, (2) enterprise size, (3) location, (4)
linkages, and (5) exposure to debt, and it will examine how and to what extent these
factors affected the performance of the SMEs. Of these factors, four are selected
(linkages are excluded) because their explicability was indicated in the surveys
reviewed above. Linkages are a new factor introduced by this study. Another factor
raised in the review is the rise in prices of input materials. Since the conditions of
material prices for the sampled SMEs in the same subsector are regarded as not so
varied, and the input costs are contained in the calculation of SME performance
indicators, this factor is not covered as an explanatory variable in this study.
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1. Market orientation
Exporting was “a door to heaven” (in the words of one SME owner interviewed)
for most Indonesian enterprises as the depreciation of the rupiah accelerated in
1998. In the metal-working and machinery industry which is basically domestic-
market-oriented, except for a portion of the electronic appliances subsector, we
have to examine the extent that the SMEs had access to the exporting business and
whether the SMEs weathered the crisis because of their export business. Although
the sample size of the study is too small to generalize results, it can give some
insights into this matter.
Table VIII shows the correlation of the selected factors with an SME perfor-
mance indicator. The performance indicator here is represented by an average of
two key indicators, namely, the growth rates of production volume and profits. Among
the factors, “export orientation” exhibits the highest correlation. It means that the
SMEs in this study have access to exporting to some extent and that exporting was
able to raise the performance of the SMEs. “Export orientation” here is measured
by the degree that the SMEs have undertaken export-related business in a broad
sense. As many as 48 per cent of the SMEs have had some export-related experi-
ences in the past, but the major portion was of a temporary or unsustainable nature.
The SMEs which exported as a business on a regular basis at the time of the crisis
and which were able to weather the crisis because of this business—“export orien-
TABLE  VIII
CORRELATION OF SELECTED FACTORS WITH SME PERFORMANCE
1. Highly positive 37 2.6 52 807 2.1 2.0
2. Positive −3 2.3 59 1,037 1.7 2.7
3. Constant −11 1.7 27 241 2.7 1.7
4. Negative −55 1.5 39 813 3.2 2.1
5. Highly negative −85 1.4 68 1,372 3.6 3.6
6. Extremely negative −100 1.0 9 109 4.0 2.0
Correlation coefficient (R) 0.93 0.31 0.08 −0.91 −0.36
Source: Author’s field study.
Note: Performance indicator: an average of the growth rates of production volume and profits
in the sample average for each level.
Export orientation: measured on a scale of 1 to 5;  1 = no experience in export-related busi-
ness, 3 = have experiences moderately committed to, 5 = have experiences highly committed
to export-related business.
Urban proximity: 1 = rural, 5 = urban. See footnote 8.
Exposure to debt: 1 = no debt, 3 = moderate debt burden, 5 = heavy debt burden.
Possible Factors Affecting Performance
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Turnover
(Rp Million)
Workforce
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tation” in a narrow sense—accounted for only 18 per cent of the sample. Of this
percentage, direct exporting accounted for 6 per cent and the remainder was indi-
rect exporting and supplying facilities to industries for export production.
Table IX shows the distribution of sampled SMEs for which market factors had a
decisive effect on performance during the crisis. Export orientation was found to be
a major market factor positively affecting performance. One example of direct ex-
porting is that of an SME that just before the crisis succeeded in switching from
supplying the domestic market to exporting its casting components for heavy equip-
ment to Japan through a Japanese trading company. The switch necessitated invest-
ment for upgrading and standardizing products, but eventually it brought a jump in
turnover in U.S. dollar terms, and which was nine times higher than a year earlier in
rupiah terms, despite a significant decrease in production volume. Another SME
has been indirectly exporting pressing parts for speakers since before the crisis
through a Japanese joint-venture assembling audio-video appliances. Other SMEs
are providing production facilities for export industries, such as water pumps for
the shrimp-breeding industry, pumps for gold mining, and pipes for the petroleum
industry. Samples in the “positive” category include a direct exporter of metal an-
tique furniture and a producer of casting gearwheels for sawmills that were shipped
to the Jepara furniture industry during its export boom. As indicated, there was no
sample that opened up a new export-related business after the crisis occurred.
TABLE  IX
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY MARKET FACTORS POSITIVELY AFFECTING SME PERFORMANCE
1. Highly positive 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 11
2. Positive 1 — 1 2 — 2 — 6
3. Constant — — 1 — 1 — — 2
4. Negative 1 — — — 1 — — 2
5. Highly negative — — — — — — — 0
6. Extremely negative — — — — — — — 0
Total 3 1 5 4 3 3 2 21
9
Source: Author’s field study.
Notes: 1. One sample can be applicable to multiple factors.
2. Export orientation here, unlike Table VIII, is in a narrow sense and refers only to
the samples which had export-related business on a regular basis at the time of the
crisis.
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Other than export orientation, there were other market orientations that had a
positive effect on SME performance (Table IX). One was import substitution. Im-
ported products and components rose in price, decreased in volume, or almost stopped
as the exchange rate dropped, and this created a vacuum in the domestic market
which substituted local products filled. The opportunity was enjoyed by producers
of petroleum pipes, medical equipment, and most prominently, machinery spare
parts such as motorcycle components, gearwheels, and cylinder liners for motors
and diesel engines, which had been dominated by the People’s Republic of China
because of the highly competitive prices of its products. One of the SMEs in the
“positive” category enjoyed the “import substitution boom” by producing casting
products on which it engraved the brandname “Donfen,” a popular brand in China.
Another positive market orientation was producing inferior goods to meet market
demand that was shifting toward necessities and used goods rather than luxuries
and new goods as the crisis lowered the level of people’s real income. The replace-
ment market for motorcycles and agricultural machinery was relatively lively for
the same reason. This situation helped the SMEs that had originally produced infe-
rior goods and spare parts to keep their production at least constant. A third market
orientation was for government or foreign donor-financed projects such as those
related to social safety net programs during the crisis. Two SMEs in this study
indirectly received a bulk order for weighing machines related to a project under
the Ministry of Education and Culture, and one SME supplied components for elec-
tricity transmission equipment related to a project for the state-owned electricity
company (PLN) financed by the World Bank. The latter case in the “highly posi-
tive” category enjoyed a jump in turnover of over nine times with a good profit
margin because of this project, after a big drop of regular orders for automobile
accessories that had a far smaller profit margin.
This study found that export orientation, import substitution, and market orienta-
tion toward inferior goods and government-related projects were major market fac-
tors that had a positive effect on SMEs. In addition, a collapse of larger producers in
the same product line favored the SMEs, such as for petroleum pipes and casting
components. It could be called “large enterprise substitution” where SMEs stepped
in to replace larger enterprises. Of these factors, the SMEs in the “highly positive”
category were successful in export-related businesses, or in shifting to high-priced
products for projects, or in shifting to low-cost inferior goods, while keeping their
total volume of production at moderate growth or constant. This is why they could
raise profitability. SMEs that supplied booming exports or government projects by
vigorously expanding volume without changing product line and cost composition
suffered a profit decrease. Even including this latter unprofitable pattern, however,
less than a half of the SMEs studied had a chance to utilize the five above favorable
market factors.
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2. Enterprise size
According to Table VIII, there is no correlation between SME performance dur-
ing the crisis and their size either in terms of workforce size or turnover. Rather, the
table shows that the larger SMEs separated into two groups, “positive” or “highly nega-
tive,” while the smaller SMEs showed “extremely negative” or “constant” performance.
In Table X the indicators of SME performance are arranged by size. The table
indicates two implications. First, the smallest SMEs, those with less than twenty
workers and pre-crisis annual turnover in 1997 averaging Rp 253 million, were the
most adversely affected. The decline in production volume, turnover, and profit
was the largest of all the size categories. As many as 86 per cent of the SMEs in this
category showed “negative” or worse performance, which indicates the existence
of disadvantages for SMEs in this smallest category. This also suggests that size
can matter.
Second, the profit ratio for the SMEs including the smallest ones remained rela-
tively high even after it fell by double digits due to the crisis, while larger enter-
prises with over 100 workers saw their profit ratio fell to below half the level of
smaller category SMEs. This fact indicates the high income-generating capacity of
the SMEs.
The above analysis on size provides no firm indication that smaller enterprises
were better off or suffered more than larger enterprises.
3. Location
The four locations covered in the field studies were widely scattered and ranged
from the industrial agglomeration in metropolitan Jakarta to a rural cluster in Cen-
tral Java. If the degree of urbanization is measured on a scale of 1 (rural) to 5
(urban),8 “urban proximity” and the performance of SMEs exhibit a negative corre-
8 1 = Ceper (Central Java), 2 = Malang (East Java), 3 = Sukabumi (West Java) and outskirts of
Surabaya, 4 = Surabaya (a provincial city in East Java), and 5 = Jakarta (the metropolitan area).
TABLE  X
PERFORMANCE OF SMES BY SIZE, 1997–98
(%)
1–19 253 21 0 −43 −32 −42 −14 18 −20
20–49 632 16 0 6 15 −27 −10 20 −10
50–99 1,343 8 −4 −20 −7 −40 −22 17 33
100– 3,380 6 0 −20 2 −39 −6 8 −21
Source: Author’s field study.
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lation (Table VIII), meaning that the more urban the location, the lower the perfor-
mance. However, with only this result it would be difficult to generalize that rural
SMEs suffered less than urban SMEs, because Ceper alone cannot be representa-
tive of rural areas in general. What can be affirmed from the analysis here is that the
SMEs in Ceper were relatively well-performing and those in Jakarta were the most
negatively affected.
The question is how to explain the relatively good performance of SMEs in Ceper.
One reason may be that production costs in Ceper were lower compared with the
equivalents in Jakarta, and Ceper’s products could meet the demand shift toward
lower-priced products during the crisis. But this reasoning cannot explain why the
majority of SMEs in Ceper were also adversely affected despite having the same
conditions as the good performers. Another reason may be that the purchasing power
in rural markets around Ceper decreased less than that in metropolitan Jakarta. But
this is also refutable because markets for Ceper’s products are not limited to the
surrounding rural markets but also reach Jakarta and the outer islands.
4. Linkages
Linkages here refer to the direct transaction relationships established by the SMEs
with buyers of their products through any form of ex ante contract.9 Since the SMEs
under study produce components and metal products, they supply these products to
such customers as assemblers (A), user-factories (U), wholesalers (W), and retail-
ers (R). The aspects of linkages examined in the interviews included the number of
customers an SME supplied, the type of largest customer, the degree of dependency
on the largest customer in terms of the share of turnover, the length of continuous
business relations with customers, and assistance the SMEs have received from
customers in such areas as technology, management, and finance.
Table XI summarizes the relationship between the performance of the SMEs and
some aspects of their linkages. The performance is better as the period of continu-
ous business relations lengthens, and to a lesser extent as the dependency on the
largest customer is lower. The ratio of subcontracting linkages (i.e., the percentage
of the enterprises that have linkages with assemblers as the largest customer) and
the degree of assistance provided by customers have no correlation with perfor-
mance, because the high indicator is split between the upper and the middle to
lower level of performance. There is also a correlation between longer period of
relationship and lower urban proximity (coefficient = 0.92). What do these results
imply?
In Jakarta, subcontracting linkages in automobile and motorcycle manufacturing
9 Forward linkages with buyers of products are discussed here because the SMEs under study are
basically producers of components and metal products, not assemblers. SME backward linkages
with subcomponent suppliers are outside the scope of this study, although some of the sample have
such linkages.
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have emerged in the last decade. The subcontractors are agglomerated in the “ex-
tended East Jakarta” area where almost all the assemblers are located, while the
subcontracting linkages reach West and East Java including Sukabumi and Surabaya.
The structure of backward linkages is hierarchical with assemblers at the apex and
with two or three tiers of subcontractors below. Some of the first-tier subcontractors
are Japanese joint-ventures or locally owned large-scale component manufacturers
and the rest, especially the second- and third-tier subcontractors, are locally owned
SMEs (Sato 1998, pp. 127–31). Thus the linkages of SMEs in the urban agglomer-
ate machinery component industry have some common features: subcontracting
linkages with assemblers as major customers, linkages newly developed in the 1990s,
high dependency on a single assembler or an upper-tier subcontractor, and a rela-
tively high degree of assistance provided by assemblers particularly in technology
and quality control.
On the other hand, Ceper, a rural cluster of over 300 small and medium-sized
home foundries, provides another view of SME linkages. Subcontracting linkages
of the urban modern machinery industry in Jakarta and Surabaya have reached the
top-tier firms in this cluster. At the same time, many SMEs have formed linkages
with wholesalers located in smaller cities outside the cluster who function as putters-
out and who intermediate orders, transmit market information, and offer trade cred-
its to the SMEs. Thus a subcontracting system and a putting-out system coexist in
Ceper (Sato 2000, p. 161). Some common features of the SME linkages in this
rural cluster are: the relatively long period of business relationships with their re-
TABLE   XI
CORRELATION OF LINKAGE FACTORS WITH SME PERFORMANCE
1. Highly positive 37 17 0.59 0.63 1.9
2. Positive −3 18 0.47 0.17 1.1
3. Constant −11 16 0.68 0.75 1.2
4. Negative −55 11 0.54 0.57 1.5
5. Highly negative −85 12 0.76 0.57 2.2
6. Extremely negative −100 4 0.75 0.50 1.4
Correlation coefficient (R) 0.86 −0.62 −0.01 −0.21
Source: Author’s field study.
Note: The “degree of assistance” from customers was measured in the areas of technology,
management, and finance based on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = no assistance, 3 = moderate assistance,
5 = intensive assistance). The three values were averaged into one for each SME. Each SME
evaluated the degree of assistance it received and this was converted by the auther into a value.
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spective customers;  the lower dependency on a single customer due to diversity of
products;  and low degree of assistance provided by customers except for financial
support by wholesalers-cum-putters-out in the form of trade credit. Given the pre-
vious finding that the SMEs in Ceper are relatively better off than those in Jakarta,
this explains the correlations between longer business relationships, lower depen-
dency on a single customer, lower urban proximity, and better performance.
The above discussion indicates that linkages can be influenced by the location
with its own business history, and that linkages can influence the market orientation
and performance of SMEs. In order to examine the relation between the type of
linkages and performance, Table XII is arranged so as to exclude two types of mar-
ket orientation with deviant performance, namely, export orientation (E) and gov-
ernment-related projects (G), and then calculates each performance indicator by
type of linkages with assemblers (A), user-factories (U), wholesalers (W), and re-
tailers (R). The table shows that of the four types the impact of the crisis was most
serious on A and U in terms of the decrease in production volume, turnover, and
profit. Meanwhile, those with trade linkages with W and R were relatively less
affected. Especially the W type suffered the least decrease in production volume
and profit and kept their profit ratio high during the crisis. This is because some of
the SMEs with W-type linkages could swiftly switch their products to import sub-
stitution or inferior goods by obtaining timely market information from wholesal-
ers. Meanwhile those with A- and U-type linkages with high dependency tended to
produce customer-specific products which limited their flexibility to switch prod-
TABLE  XII
PERFORMANCE OF THE SMES BY TYPE OF LIKAGES, 1997–98
(%)
Government
projects (G1) 9 0 55 322 −21 −21 27 69
Export orientation (E) 3 0.4 −1 151 13 −4 17 0
Wholesalers (W) 7 0 −17 5 −3 −5 21 0
Retailers (R) 4 0 −33 −27 −44 −2 16 −20
Assemblers (A) 19 0 −47 −38 −63 −24 19 −42
User-factories (U) 6 0 −67 −59 −92 −9 12 −19
Government
projects (G2) 2 −9.5 −90 −87 −100 −10 0 −20
Source: Author’s field study.
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ucts in a short period of time. Such SMEs tended to suffer badly once the assembler
or user-factory started to decrease production levels. On the other hand, if the as-
sembler was engaged in an export-related business, the SMEs automatically per-
form well, as shown by the split in the indicator for the ratio of subcontracting
linkages in Table XI. Some subcontractors who had minor linkages with wholesal-
ers before the crisis shifted their priority after orders from the assemblers dropped
and successfully compensated for the drop by shifting to import substitution goods
with enhancing their linkages with wholesalers. Thus the linkages which the SMEs
formed with buyers became an important determinant of performance and behavior
for survival during the crisis.
Another finding pointed out in Table XII is that government-related projects could
have a double-edged effect on the performance of SMEs. On the one hand SMEs
could experience a significant upsurge in turnover (G1), but they could suffer more
seriously than SMEs with other ordinary business linkages by a sudden termination
of projects, as shown by the indicators of G2.
5. Exposure to debt
The last factor to be examined is exposure to debt. In this study 38 per cent of the
samples had some debts at the time of the crisis in the form of loans from state and
private banks, state-owned enterprises, and rural financiers, and 8 per cent had fi-
nancing from private venture capital companies.
According to Table VIII, there is no correlation between debt exposure and per-
formance, because debt exposure was high in both the “positive” and “highly nega-
tive” categories of performance. However, if a distinction is made between debt for
investment and that for working capital, then 75 per cent of the indebted SMEs in
the “negative” and “highly negative” categories used the fund for investment, while
the ratio was only 29 per cent in the “positive” and “highly positive” categories.
This fact indicates that as interest rates rose significantly during the crisis, the debt
burden greatly affected the profitability of SMEs with debts for investment because
they could not repay in the short term unlike debt for working capital. Some SMEs
expended their whole gross profit to repay investment debt and some stopped re-
payment.
The field studies brought to light two types of SMEs heavily affected by invest-
ment debt. The first type were the SMEs, mostly subcontractors, which had grown
rapidly during in the last few years before the crisis and had expanded their in-
stalled production capacity relying on the growth projections for orders from as-
semblers. The second type were those which had imported high-tech facilities without
any clear order projections or market information from order providers. Although
the performance of these two types looks similar, the latter is not a debt problem
arising from the unexpected crisis but one caused by weak financial management
which allowed excess investment not driven by the market.
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C. SMEs’ Responses to the Crisis
The AKATIGA and Asia Foundation survey (1999) found that SMEs had not
responded effectively to the crisis, but this study noted some effective responses.
One successful survival measure taken by some SMEs was a flexible switch in
products or business lines. In order to do this, they effectively utilized their existing
linkages rather than forming new linkages. Some SMEs switched their products to
goods for the replacement market or the import substitution market, and benefited
from the wholesaler’s capability to search markets. Wholesalers sometimes helped
in the switch by providing materials in kind and by raising the amount of advance
payments. Some other SMEs started to sell raw materials that were left over after
the decrease in their production to upper-tier subcontractors, or began to remake
and resell various kinds of used components to wholesalers.
Another measure was a sharpened awareness of cost reduction. One sample SME
increased its employment of school trainees to minimize wage costs. Another SME,
which obtained a good deal of project-related orders after a temporary drop in pro-
duction, only increased the number of its contracted day-workers and not its regular
employees to make it easier to adjust its workforce to fluctuations in orders. A
subcontractor of components carrying a heavy burden of debt decided to “rational-
ize” his inventory of products reducing it from two months to half a month. To do
this, the firm requested the assemblers to provide the procurement schedule before-
hand and to fix it without any sudden change in the volume of orders.
This study also found that all of the SMEs responded to the crisis in individual
ways: Collective responses were very limited despite some SMEs being located in
agglomerations or clusters. In utilizing their existing linkages, they relied on bilat-
eral vertical relationships formed by individual enterprises which did not give rise
to collective horizontal cooperation among the SMEs. This observation may be
related to the inclination of the SMEs toward self-support rather than collectivity as
indicated also in the AKATIGA and Asian Foundation survey. However, a further
study is needed to examine whether and under what conditions collectivity effec-
tively works.
SMEs’ responses for survival varied by individual enterprise and did not depend
on the degree of suffering or on size. Some of the well-performing SMEs still sought
for more markets or tried to cut costs further, while some heavily affected SMEs
with almost no orders seemed to be only waiting for new orders to come in.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper has concentrated on analyzing the impact of Indonesia’s economic crisis
on SMEs based on field studies of the metal-working and machinery component
industry in Java.
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The study found that 65 per cent of the aggregate sample of SMEs in this worst-
hit subsector were affected negatively, but that performance showed wide variation,
ranging from those with almost no profit and no production activities to those en-
joying a jump in turnover several times higher than their pre-crisis level. Thus the
sample distribution by performance became bimodal with the first peak at the “nega-
tive” / “highly negative” category and the second peak at the “highly positive” /  “posi-
tive” category. The fact that the variation in performance was observed in the same
industry, product, and location indicates that there are some other factors affecting
the performance of these SMEs. The important factors were market orientation at
the time of the crisis and the linkages that each SME had formed with buyers of its
products in the years before the crisis. Export-related businesses and government-
related projects were market factors that contributed to making SMEs profitable by
assuring them of good markets. Other positive market orientations were producing
import substitution goods or inferior goods, or substituting for larger enterprises.
The well-performing SMEs were flexible in switching their product lines toward
such markets as import substitution or inferior goods by effectively utilizing their
long-standing linkages with wholesalers-cum-putters-out who were capable of
searching for markets. The fact that such linkages with wholesalers-cum-putters-
out are prevalent in Ceper in Central Java explains the correlation between better
performance and lower urban proximity. On the other hand, SMEs which had link-
ages with assemblers and user-factories with high dependency suffered badly, ex-
cept for export-related businesses, because of the limited flexibility they had in
shifting to products with better markets. This pattern included the SME subcontrac-
tors in the industrial agglomeration in East Jakarta that had developed rapidly in the
last decade. Thus this study found evidence that the linkages in which each SME
was embedded determined to a great extent the degree that an SME was affected by
the crisis and the way it survived the crisis. Some SMEs manifested their business
capability in the way they utilized their existing linkages. Also, the difference of
SME performance by location proved to be greatly influenced by the difference in
types of linkages prevailing in the area, rather than that in production costs and
market conditions. Other findings of this study are that the SMEs with high expo-
sure to debt for investment, and in the smallest size category suffered more in the
crisis, but that there is no linear correlation between size and performance.
The findings of this study should alter the perception of SMEs and how their
problems should be dealt with. First, it is important to realize that SMEs are far
from uniform. Their performance as well as responses during the crisis demon-
strate their individual variation. These were not primarily determined by size, prod-
uct, or location. A uniform perception of seeing them as “weak SMEs,” “badly
suffering SMEs,” or “flourishing SMEs” will hamper perceiving the actual state of
SMEs.
Second, if there are external causes which widen the variation of performance
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among SMEs, something should be done to remove these. These causes could in-
clude uneven accessibility to needed materials, funds, or market information, and
unequal opportunity for upgrading their capabilities through training and educa-
tion. This study showed that linkages can function as a connection to markets, as a
channel of information for the SMEs, and in some cases as a shock absorber in
adverse situations. Given such benefits, there is a natural tendency for the govern-
ment to step in to promote linkage formations for SMEs. However, linkage forma-
tion is essentially a market-driven process, not a policy-led one, so that the role of
government should be carefully limited to preparing a business environment where
linkages work effectively. One example is a situation where SMEs have disadvan-
tage in linkages because of their weak bargaining power vis-à-vis order providers.
Some of the SMEs in this study claimed that payments from large-scale assemblers
and user-factories, which took about one month after delivery in the pre-crisis days,
were delayed by more than one or two or even three months during the crisis. The
role for the government is to have accurate knowledge of the problems facing SMEs,
especially in adverse situations, and to provide an institutional framework for re-
moving disadvantages due to their smallness.
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